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Abstract—A large majority of cheap Internet of Things (IoT)
devices that arrive brand new, and are configured with out-of-the-
box settings, are not being properly secured by the manufactures,
and are vulnerable to existing malware lurking on the Internet.
Among them is the Mirai botnet which has had its source code
leaked to the world, allowing any malicious actor to configure
and unleash it. A combination of software assets not being
utilised safely and effectively are exposing consumers to a full
compromise. We configured and attacked 4 different IoT devices
using the Mirai libraries. Our experiments concluded that three
out of the four devices were vulnerable to the Mirai malware and
became infected when deployed using their default configuration.
This demonstrates that the original security configurations are
not sufficient to provide acceptable levels of protection for
consumers, leaving their devices exposed and vulnerable. By
analysing the Mirai libraries and its attack vectors, we were able
to determine appropriate device configuration countermeasures
to harden the devices against this botnet, which were successfully
validated through experimentation.
Index Terms—IoT, Mirai, botnet, malware
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) has become more popular than
ever with the heightened thirst for making our planet smart.
The ability to have electronics take over the jobs that people
have no desire to do has become more attractive than ever.
This advancement, however, is far more sophisticated than we
can imagine and with it came new waves of cyber-attacks. A
report from F5 labs found a 280% growth in attacks on IoT
devices with a large chunk of this growth stemming from the
Mirai malware [1] while Symantec’s report [2] for the year
2016–2017 showed a 600% growth of IOT cyber-attacks.
Cyber-attacks can originate from a vast number of different
sources, using a variety of methods. Cyber-physical attacks
are a result of a breach to the sensors of an IoT device which
enables the adversary to access the device’s data, resources or
even create a backdoor to the system which can go unseen.
Software attacks originate from malware being installed onto a
device which can corrupt or steal data, which could potentially
be very valuable. A slightly more dangerous attack occurs
when the device’s encryption keys are compromised which
allows the attackers full control over the system. Malicious
parties can, however, cause serious damage to such devices
and networks without acquiring actual physical access to
them. Network attacks are performed when adversaries can
insert themselves between the device and network to perform
actions, such as redirecting packets or igniting a significant
disruption, such as a Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. These
DDoS attacks can be performed by a large collection of com-
promised devices, controlled by one master device, commonly
known as a controller, that flood the bandwidth of a chosen
system with traffic. In October 2016 the source code for the
Mirai malware was leaked and made public by an anonymous
user. This was the most common malware to infect IoT devices
and was specifically designed to target and exploit vulnerable
devices.
The term Internet of Things can encompass any form of de-
vice that is connected to the Internet. It is, however, becoming
more common for the definition to refer to sensors and other
devices which autonomously communicate with each other to
share information. IoT devices can benefit anybody, ranging
from individual consumers to large industries. According to
Statista [3], there were 23.14 billion connected IoT devices
worldwide in 2018, which is projected to increase to 75.44
billion by 2025 [4]. With the number of connected devices
expected to triple in the next six years, the IoT has the potential
to have an enormous global impact. Additionally, Statista [3]
estimate that by 2020 all forms of Business use for IoT devices
will surpass 3.17 billion installed units, compared to just 1.5
billion in 2014.
The sudden rise of malware attacks on these devices is a
serious concern for consumers and businesses alike. By study-
ing how malware, in this case specifically the Mirai malware
family, performs, behaves, and infects devices, it is possible to
develop countermeasures and understanding in order to reduce
the number of attacks which can be performed on companies
and private networks. To build towards this, we tested the
robustness of four different IoT devices against Mirai infection
and investigated device configurations to increase the security
and reduce their susceptibility to Mirai.
The contributions of our work are summarised as follows:
• The architecture of a test network, where a Coolead
IP Camera, a Raspberry Pi, a Siricam and a Virtual
Simulated IoT device are placed.
• The orchestration of attacks against the IoT devices using
the Mirai botnet attack vectors.
• A robust configuration and evaluation of the defensive
mechanisms implemented on chosen devices to suppress
the threat of becoming infected by Mirai.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II
provides technical background and related literature on the
Internet of Things, while Section III briefly describes the
methodology of the experiment and the respective results. Sec-
tion IV describes the suggested defence mechanisms applied
to our testbed to reduce the probability of being infected by
Mirai. Section V draws the conclusions giving some pointers
for future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE
A. Internet of Things Devices
The different types of IoT devices available to purchase
range from smart bike locks to smart home devices, such as
fridges and plugs. IoT has become such a diverse market,
with new mechanisms for engaging with our homes and
devices becoming available regularly. The possibilities have
become endless and there is almost a sense of dependency on
these devices developing in recent years. IoT devices can be
categorised into various archetypes, described below.
Wearable devices have become very popular and sought
after, often offering both health and fitness tracking capabil-
ities. The integration of heartbeat sensors and step counters
have upgraded the fitness landscape and opened the doors for
IoT technology to thrive on it. Devices such as smart rings
have been designed which offer features such as contactless
payments and Near Field Communication (NFC).
Smart home devices offer the ability to have almost all
the devices in your life connected to the Internet. Everything
ranging from clocks, door bells, cameras, heating systems,
light bulbs and even window blinds. The most notable de-
vices include the Nest smart thermostats [5] and the Amazon
Echo [6]. Nest made it possible to control the heating of a
household from anywhere in the world using a mobile phone,
offering features such as timing control, temperature control
and smart alerts. Amazon Echo is a smart speaker with seven
microphones facilitating clear voice interaction, allowing users
to ask questions or perform actions without having to touch a
screen, keyboard, or mouse.
Tesla opened the world to the concept of the smart car,
which offered voice recognition and took the word impossible
out of the self-driving car theory, with tests happening all over
the world to make this a reality. Recently the introduction of a
wireless Internet connection in many cities made the concept
of a smart city become a reality and now technology such as
intelligent traffic light systems exist, all made possible through
the Internet of Things.
In the cyber security community, there is a frequent joke
which states the S in IoT stands for Security. It is far from
obvious that there is no S. The dispersion and propagation of
devices belonging to the Internet of Things has propelled the
adoption of such wide ranges of Internet connected devices,
facilitating far more automation and information exchange
than was previously possible. However, as with any device
accessible to the Internet, there is no such thing as a com-
pletely secure device or network. Malicious parties and cyber
criminals lie in wait, with complete stealth, for a vulnerability
or misconfiguration to present itself.
The rise of new malware families targeting IoT devices has
only exacerbated existing problems with botnets, and has led
to attackers exploiting such devices to the extent that they
are referred to specifically as Thingbots. F5 Labs conducted a
report [7], following the timeline of the Thingbots discovery.
It traced the first instance back to March 2016, with the
Remaiten malware, which attacked home routers over Telnet
to launch DDoS attacks. With DDoS attacks still the most
utilised attack, these Thingbots are being used to install Tor
nodes and proxy servers, steal crypto currencies, hijack DNS
servers and siphon credentials. The process usually begins with
adversaries performing global scans searching for known open
ports that allow an administrator shell, followed by infection.
IoT devices are not just targeted at random by all the
malware in the wild, they are chosen. A litany of security
flaws and vulnerabilities make devices in the Internet of
Things prime targets for exploitation by malware. Services
made accessible such as Telnet and secure shell (SSH) are
manufactured with default passwords that is hardcoded in the
firmware and the ability to change these passwords is either
a difficult process for consumers or is entirely impossible for
them. If the consumer did, however, manage to change the
administrator password, other services offered by the device
remain vulnerable to exploitation [8]. For example, in 2015 the
FBI issued a warning, which is still relevant today, to disable
Universal Plug n Play (UPnP) [9]. UPnP is a process where a
nearby device connects itself automatically to a network with
no username or password required, providing absolutely no
authentication what so ever. Malware can use this protocol to
gain access to more IoT devices on that network.
An IoT device consists of two major elements: hardware,
and software. Hardware is less susceptible to becoming ex-
ploited as it is the physical components of the device and can
have every aspect of its design tested to ensure it meets the ex-
pected requirements. Hardware also needs to be physically put
into the hands of attackers to become exploited and therefore
if, placed in a secure location, is far easier to protect. Software,
however, is far more complex and responsible for a wide range
of problems and dangers associated within IoT. A major flaw
within software is the inability to update firmware versions
on many devices leaving the firmware version outdated and
far more vulnerable. Security and firmware updates not only
provide up to date malware protection but can patch any form
of weakness or security flaw within the firmware’s code as
they are discovered.
B. Mirai Botnet
In August 2016, MalwareMustDie [10], a security research
blog, discovered the malware that shook the world, the Mirai
botnet. A report on the blog stated the botnet was created using
ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) binaries which are very
common on operating systems such as Linux. They discovered
that Mirai targets SSH or Telnet protocols, exploiting the
hardcoded and default credentials on many devices to access
these services. Mirai also has the capability to launch brute
force attacks using a targeted database of known credentials for
specified brands and manufacturers of IoT devices. The ELF
format used to create Mirai is implemented into the firmware
of IoT devices, such as IP cameras, routers and smart devices,
which is what makes them so vulnerable to attack [11]. Mirai
has very complex and intelligent code which allows it to
defend itself once it has compromised a device, preventing
other malware from infecting the device its embedded in. Thus,
Mirai can remain in a device without the possibility of another
malware interfering with it [12].
The effect Mirai has on devices it has infected has been stud-
ied in order to determine its effects on device usability, power
consumption, and network bandwidth consumption [13]. On
several smart devices the power consumed by Mirai was
found to have a negligible effect on the device during normal
operations, but when the device participates in an attack the
network bandwidth used increases by a considerable amount.
As for its impact on regular device operation, functions were
delayed by milliseconds, but some attacks caused the device
to crash and reboot there affecting and degrading user expe-
rience. A separate study [14] used HoneyPots to observe and
monitor network behaviour on a network comprised of many
IoT devices, analysing traffic from the likes of Bashlite and
Mirai over a substantial timeframe. It received over 2,385,460
commands from IP addresses and its overall conclusion was
that Mirai and Bashlite both evolved significantly over the
experimental duration, which is a serious cause for concern. It
was apparent that newer botnets were learning and becoming
more effective at deploying their attacks and choosing what
attacks were most destructive for different software and hard-
ware configurations [14].
C. Related Literature
Kolias et al. [15] demonstrate that if confidential credentials
are built-in to the devices firmware, but it lacks a channel
to perform software updates, and the credentials leak, the
information remains exposed for a substantial amount of time,
thus making the devices vulnerable to multiple threats.
Pa et al. [16], analysing the rise of IoT compromises, found
that a range of 43 distinct malware samples were capable of
being executed on 11 different CPU architectures. Of these
CPU architectures, all the CPU names used in Mirai’s infection
process were found linking the different types of malware
to exploit the CPU chips used in IoT devices. The same
work also investigates Telnet-based attacks, finding that 91%
of the 29,844 scanned hosts were running Linux. A large
percentage of the devices were found to be DVRs and IP
cameras. The summary of the paper concluded that of the 39
days their IoTPOT was running, a set of sandbox environments
running Linux OS for embedded devices with different CPU
architectures, 70,230 unique hosts visited the device. Among
them, 49,141 logged in and 16,934 attempted to download
external malware binary files. This means over 20% of the
Linux embedded devices were vulnerable to malware, which
simulated a very similar firmware to those embedded in
consumer IoT devices.
Angrishi et al. [17] claim that the Internet of Things is
becoming the Internet of Vulnerabilities. Their work takes a
closer look at the evolution of malware in IoT and how it
has progressed up to the most predominant malware, Mirai.
Findings show that a large percentage of malware infections
recruit the IoT device into botnets, most commonly to perform
DDoS attacks. Another common similarity is that they often
brute forcing open terminal ports, such as Telnet and SSH,
with default credentials. The authors also discuss the root
causes of the vulnerabilities present in IoT devices and links it
to the rush of implementing new products and services through
3rd parties.
Edwards et al. [18] whose work focused on the Hijime
malware, a decentralised Internet worm for IoT devices, iden-
tified that the infection process was very similar to that of
Mirai, using username/password combinations through Telnet
or SSH ports to establish a connection. The worm also worked
effectively on BusyBox embedded Linux devices. The Hijime
was found to be using BitTorrent’s DHT protocol for peer
discovery and uTorrent’s transport protocol for data exchange.
This was a unique set of methods used compared to that of
other malware including Mirai. The paper concluded that a
difference of the Hijime worm compared to Mirai is that it
offered no malicious payloads and was perhaps in a phase
where the author wanted to expand its scale and accumulate
a larger botnet before deploying attacking payloads.
Understanding the ports and protocols of interest is a key
element in understanding many security vulnerabilities in the
IoT. Members of the Honeynet Project [19] conducted research
analysing 24 Internet attacks. From their work, they found
particular protocols to be of interest causing vulnerabilities.
Some of these were protocols exploited by Mirai including
HTTP, Telnet and SSH. They discovered HTTP to be one
of the main vectors for exploitation, with 245 HTTP packets
received to their testing environment in the 24–hour timeframe.
For the Telnet protocol, of 1,075 connections, 835 were able to
login successfully with a username and password. 750 of these
were generated by bots which were more than likely to be
compromised IoT devices. The project continues to monitor its
honeypots to study the attack vectors being deployed, however,
a conclusion the authors came to was that these botnets rely
on weak and non-existent security measures on their targets
which IoT devices are providing.
To deal with the magnitude of devices being compromised
there simply is not enough being done. Researchers at the
institute for critical infrastructure technology [20] investigated
the behavior of malwares such as Bashlite and Mirai in action
as Practise Runs which implies they believe there is a much
more severe and destructive wave of attacks coming at a level
unseen. They believe Mirai demonstrates how negligently and
rapidly developed IoT software has become and this will
only fuel attackers to act upon it to leverage and devour
it for malicious purposes. Their research has led the belief
that the 3–minute delay between bots becoming re-infected
after a reboot is not due to the malware taking time to
rediscover its vulnerability, but because there are so many
armies of botnets fighting to reclaim the vulnerable host first.
A proposed approach to help wage war against attackers is
the development of penetration testing tools for IoT software
and hardware. This not only opens the possibility for experts
in their designated fields to help discover vulnerabilities, it
reduces manufactures costs by allowing others to discover the
flaws for them. They also offer the suggestion of improvement
at organisational level for security controls. This can include
the basic training of cyber-hygiene and fundamental security
controls which can limit the susceptibility to botnets.
As IoT continues to expand at its current rate, and its depen-
dency escalates as society moves towards automation, there is
a thriving need to lay the framework and set the foundations
to ensure the security and safety is given the same fuel as
the thirst for its functionality. Ahmad et al. [21] focused on
large scale IoT security testing, benchmarking and certification
states. They came to a conclusion that for the future of IoT,
features and mechanisms need to be established and put in
place to ensure that in large scale conditions, everything is
duly certified and tested accordingly. Antonakakis et al. [22]
provide a comprehensive analysis of Mirai’s emergence and
evolution, presenting the range of devices it targeted and
infected, along with the attacks it executed. Their findings
show that Mirai’s emergence was primarily based on the
absence of security best practices in the IoT space and not on
the unique security challenges introduced by the IoT devices.
More recently, Pitropakis et al. [23] created a whole framework
namely NEON that collects information from multiple probes
to win the fight against Adcanced Persistent Threats and
malware families that constantly mutate.
Our work differentiates from all the previous approaches
because our target is twofold. First of all we want to test
whether Mirai can still infect modern everyday devices using
attack vectors described by the related literature. Additionally,
we want to explore efficient and simple countermeasures that
can improve the security of IoT devices and their robustness
against the Mirai attacks.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Before diving into our experimental setup it should be noted
that one of the key challenges of our work was understanding
the Mirai malware, as it is a very complex piece of mal-
ware with a large number of functions and actions it could
perform. Building on top of this, being able to infect the
chosen IoT device and gain administrative privileges was our
goal as different brands of device have different firmware
configurations. As our work used a live and active piece
of malware, it had to be contained properly, as it would
risk leaking the malware onto the rest of our network, thus
converting our infrastructure to a zombie army for Mirai. It
is therefore a secure form of practise to use Virtual machines
to conduct the testing on. There were two virtual machines
used, one to act as a controller for Mirai, capturing reports
once exploitation has taken place and to deploy the malware’s
code. The second virtual machine was connected to the router
attached to the devices. The virtual machine was run from
VMware Workstation 14 Player version 14.1.3 which is a
free software package specialising in cloud computing and
virtualisation to offer the use of multiple virtual machines
running their own operating system independent of the host.
The operating systems used to run Mirai in this experiment
was Linux Debian 9.8.0.
Fig. 1. Experimental Network Design
In recent cases of the Mirai malware being deployed onto
devices, the source code has been known to delete the files and
code used to infect the device after its execution, thus making
it extremely difficult to find and examine the code [10]. The
Mirai malware was designed to have at a minimum two servers
to be able to effectively run the virus and manage to obtain
a botnet to use. One server is needed to run the command
and control aspect as well as a MySQL database to collect
and store bot information. The second server is used to act as
a scan receiver and a bot loader. The bot loader will use an
advanced SYN scanner which is very resource efficient and
will be used to execute the commands given to it from the
command and control server once it has gained access to a
bot.
The attack begins with scanning IP addresses to find poten-
tial victim devices to attempt to exploit. The source code of
Mirai is interesting as it is hardcoded to avoid a specific set of
IP addresses which can endanger the malicious parties, leading
to their detection. The code is written to avoid scanning
internal IPs so for this experiment the source code was edited
so the code only scans IP addresses within our network. This
is mainly to avoid infecting unaware people and preserve our
resources. Another interesting aspect of the source code is
Mirai’s ability to assert its dominance by using techniques to
remove other botnets and malware that might already be on
the device, and then block any future malware from being able
to cohabitate with it, effectively achieving a similar goal to the
one in this paper.
A technique known as memory scraping can then take place,
which removes all other botnet processes on the device’s
memory. This will actively look for QBOT [24], UPX [25] and
Zollard [26] malwares which are popular viruses/worms on
IoT devices. QBOT is another botnet malware like Mirai, but
is much less sophisticated. UPX is a software packer that can
make reverse engineering of malware very difficult, requiring
specialist knowledge. The Zollard worm is used for mining
cryptocurrency on a compromised device without the user
having any idea it is occurring. Another kill script was found
in the code which eradicates a very similar botnet malware
found in IoT devices named Anime/Kami [22]. The function
is specifically designed for this malware and will instantly
remove it from the device if discovered. Once IoT devices
have been discovered through the IP address scan the next step
Mirai takes is to attempt to remotely access it by logging into
the device. Mirai performs a type of brute force dictionary
attack by using a list of default credentials hardcoded into
irresponsibly secured IoT devices.
Our experimentation was designed to be broken into four
individual stages. For each stage to be a success it relies on
the previous stage to have been accurately carried out with no
problems and the objectives completed effectively.
• Stage one involves the setup of the network and devices.
The network will be setup through the two virtual ma-
chines running and ready to serve commands. The chosen
IP cameras will be setup according to the instructions
provided by the manufacturer and no further changes will
be made aside from the instructions given. These devices
can then be setup to be discovered by the command and
control server for Mirai on the virtual machine by setting
up a chosen IP address block. An IP scan will then take
place to ensure the devices are discovered on the network
as intended and that they are functioning correctly.
• Stage two involves the setup of the Mirai malware. This
will include any editing to the code required and a setup
so the control and command server on the first virtual
machine can begin the infection process. Next the bot
scanner will be initialised to scan and gain access to the
devices. In this stage the devices will become exposed to
the malware. A time limit of ten minutes will be given
which is more than enough time for Mirai to carry out its
infection and will allow room for error should there be
connectivity issues or any other networking issue. After
exposure a full analysis of the results will take place.
• Stage three is the design and implementation of secu-
rity measures based on the post exposure analysis. The
analysis of the devices after stage two will expose the
vulnerabilities in the devices and hopefully show what
routes the malware took to gain access into the devices.
This then allows rules and configurations to be designed
and implemented onto the devices to help prevent them
becoming compromised.
• Stage four will be a repetition of stage two, however this
time the devices will have the newly designed security
measures implemented on them. The aim of this stage is
to discover how effective, if at all, the measures were and
if they succeeded with their purpose to prevent exposure.
A. Launching the attacks against our testbed
Four target IoT devices were used for this experiment.
Three of them are consumer products while the fourth was
a virtualised simulation of an IoT device. We also developed
a script to automate the installation of the Mirai malware
on to the virtual machine. By running the script, it would
automatically install all the necessary dependencies, cross
compilers and functions to run the malware. However, it must
be noted certain files still needed to be edited manually to
include the IP address of the virtual machines as this was
defined by the user and could not be predicted.
Coolead IP Camera: This device offers integrated Wi-
Fi, local video storage and an FTP/mail alert system for its
motion detection feature. To discover what ports where open
on the IP camera an Nmap scan was done on its IP address
which revealed it had the Telnet port 23 open, the HTTP
port 80 and Asterix port 8600. To access the devices camera
application, someone can visit its IP address in the browser
on port 80 which prompted a username and password. To gain
root access to the device and Telnet port a hydra attack was
executed to attempt to crack the credentials. Based on the
device not being properly branded, it was assumed default
root credentials were hardcoded so a text file containing
known root credentials could be used. After a successful
login using the cracked credentials to Telnet it was discovered
that BusyBox was installed and with this the version and
commands allowing access to the file system, which could
be cancerous if exploited by the likes of Mirai malware as it
would have root privileges. The HTTP port was also accessed
using the cracked credentials which gave full access to the
cameras video feed and the option to fully customise all the
settings including network configuration
Raspberry Pi: The operating system used was Raspbian
Stretch which was connected to the network via ethernet. The
raspberry Pi is becoming extremely popular around the world
and allow developers and programmers to write their own
software to use on this portable and simple device. The tool
Nmap was once again used to discover what open ports the
system came with by default. To SSH and Telnet into the
device and to gain root access the default credentials were
used which could be easily cracked if required. Access to
these privileges would allow any form of tampering to the
system and allow a malware like Mirai to hijack and turn
this device into a bot without complications. To login and
access the camera the HTTP browser was used and accessed
by entering the devices IP address. The application simply
needed the default credentials entered to allow access to the
stream.
Sricam IP Camera: This camera offers a wall mount and
metal shell to allow outdoor use and weatherproofing, with
a 1080p HD capability, motions detection and Wi-Fi. The
device uses an android, iOS or windows application, which
requires the user to sign up and then discover the device on
their network and add via a user name and password. An
Nmap scan of the device only revealed two open ports which
were unexpected. The device did not have a web server or
Telnet server running and used ports used to stream its footage
through the app. Port 554 is a Microsoft real time streaming
protocol (RTSP) and is used to accept incoming and outgoing
packets to a client streaming using the RTSP protocol. Port
5000 is used by Universal Plug N’ Play to accept incoming
connections from other UPnP devices.
The discovery that the device used RTSP lead to further
research of the protocol to discover how it functioned and what
role it played in allowing the cameras footage to be streamed
to devices. As it was a real time streaming protocol run over
port 554, there was a question of whether or not the stream
could be intercepted and viewed in a media application without
having to provide any form of authentication. It was discovered
that the RTSP protocol was susceptible to a URL brute force
attack by attempting to enumerate media URLs by testing for
common paths. iSpyConnect [27] provided the endpoint of the
URL for the Sricam model being used for the experiment. The
media application used to intercept the stream was VLC player
which allowed the ability to connect to a network stream
using a URL. The application Angry IP Scanner was used
to discover the IP cameras IP address. Typing the suggested
address displayed the camera’s live footage without having to
provide any credentials or form of authentication.
Simulated IoT Device (Ubuntu with Busybox): The
simulated device was setup using a VMware virtual machine
on an isolated private network. The virtual machine was setup
to run Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS with BusyBox. This represented
a vulnerable IoT device and was configured with default
credentials, as well as running BusyBox’s Telnetd server on
port 23. The web server on port 80 was also configured to
make it as similar to a physical IoT device as possible.
The first stage of our methodology was to setup the network
and virtual machines. Two virtual machines running Debian
9.6.0 were installed to act as a command and control server
and a bot scanner. The machines were setup using a bridged
connection so that they acted almost entirely independent
from the host machine. The IP addresses were allocated by
DHCP in the local network by the router. Terminal was used
to SSH into the virtual machines and login as a root user.
This allowed the execution of commands, however, was not
absolutely necessary as these could be executed in the virtual
machine’s terminal application. The application WinSCP was
used as an FTP server to transfer the Mirai source code files
onto the virtual machines and to edit any files that needed
appending.
Soon afterwards, the Command and Control virtual machine
was used to initiate the botnet. Once the botnet process
was started, the CNC CLI panel was logged into using the
servers IP address and the specified port that is chosen in the
configuration. Once logged in the number of bots connected to
the botnet as well as the range of attack vectors can be seen.
The next step was to perform a zmap scan on the network to
search for active IPs with the port’s Telnet and/or SSH open.
Once these were discovered the attack could take place to
attempt to login to the newly made list of IP addresses. Mirai
uses its pre-defined list of default credentials to attempt to
authenticate and login to the devices. As previously discussed
some of our devices are using root logins, thus making them
extremely likely to be infected. Next the devices are brute
forced in the attempt to login with root privileges.
If successful, the malware will use the tool wget to install its
payload and binaries onto the device using commands that are
pre-configured in the source code. If the device does not have
wget installed, the malware has an alternative and attempts
to use TFTP instead to infect the device. If the compromise
and brute force attack is a success the loader will show the
successful login in the text and on the botnets CLI panel the
bot count will increase by one. Next, one by one, the devices
were connected to the local network and exposed to the botnet
process in an attempt to infect the device and in turn, convert to
a bot. Confirmation of the malware successfully compromising
and infecting the device is shown in the command and control
panel with an increase in the bot count from 0 to 1.
B. Outcomes of the Attacks
Coolead IP Camera: As this device was found to be using
Telnet running BusyBox and HTTP it was assumed Mirai
would be successful in its attempt to compromise the device.
This was further backed up by the cracking of its credentials
which were found to be simple defaults that were included
in Mirai’s password list. The device was compromised in 9
seconds.
Raspberry Pi: The Pi was running both Telnet and SSH as
well as HTTP. Documentation for the installation states that
it comes pre-configured with its default credentials defined,
and it is assumed a large majority of Raspberry Pi users,
of which a large percentage are amateurs to the computing
industry, would leave these credentials unchanged. The device
was compromised in 11 seconds.
Sricam IP Camera: The Sricam IP camera proved itself to
be a well-protected device in terms of the malware exploita-
tion. Although it was found to leak the video footage without
any credentials needed via a ONVIF network stream using
VLC, its lack of open ports that allow a shell to perform
terminal commands proved secure. The malware needs to
be able to execute commands directly onto the device and
the Sricams function to only use the essential ports to run
its app was a fundamental reason this camera came out un-
compromised.
IoT Simulated Device (Ubuntu with Busybox): As this
device was simulated, it contained a very similar setup to
the Coolead IP camera with its running Telnet server and
BusyBox install. This, like the Coolead, suggested it was
a prime and vulnerable target for the Mirai and would be
compromised significantly easily. As it was designed to have
default credentials, it was presumed confidently it would be
easily cracked by the brute force and Mirai loader, thus being
compromised in 9 seconds.
IV. SUGGESTED DEFENCES
As the devices have been exposed and in certain cases,
compromised, defensive measures are required in order to
TABLE I
DEFENSIVE MEASURES PER DEVICE
Defensive Action
Device Coolead IP Camera Raspberry Pi 3 Sricam IP Camera Simulated IoT Device
Change Telnet Credentials Password changed Telnet disabled. SSH made primary protocol Telnet Not Enabled Password changed
Change Telnet Port Randomised port Randomised port SSH Not Enabled Randomised port
Changed Web browser credentials Password changed Password changed HTTP Not Enabled Password changed
Disable SMTP N/A Protocol disabled without root privileges Not Enabled N/A
Replace HTTP with HTTPS N/A HTTPS with self signed SSL certificates HTTP Not enabled N/A
Busybox shell exclusive to root Only root allowed Only root login No access to root shell Only root allowed
minimise the possibility of the Mirai malware being able to
infect the devices again. An analysis of the modifications made
by the malware on compromised devices was performed to see
what changes had been made. This assisted us in the decisions
of what measures need to be implemented. The proposed
counter measures are summarised in Table I.
The malware used the Telnet port (23) to attempt to connect
and gain root access by brute forcing default login credentials.
Telnet is extremely insecure and transfers login credentials in
plain text with its connections. It also offers the ability to
perform important actions or modifications to the operating
system, or access to root files that should be unmodified or
tampered with. SSH is a more secure protocol to use, and
although it is vulnerable in newer strands of the malware
becoming available, a strong set of login credentials can make
the brute forcing of an attacker extremely difficult and time
depleting. Disabling Telnet, however, can be made extremely
difficult as devices running the likes of BusyBox cannot
support SSH without having to recompile the system. If Telnet,
however, is essential, changing the port number it runs on to
for example ‘2330’ will be beneficial as the malware’s loader
will a large majority of the time scan port 23. Our suggested
counter measure is that the Telnet protocol should be disabled
and SSH used in preference if possible. Change Telnet port if
the protocol is essential to the device.
Some of the devices were running the HTTP protocol on
port 80. HTTP creates what is deemed an insecure connection
which is prone to interception and eavesdropping by attackers.
HTTPS however, on port 443, offers a secure encrypted con-
nection using SSL certificates which allows data sent over the
web to be encrypted and secured from anybody unauthorised
or not the recipient to view the data. Our suggested counter
measure is to disable the HTTP on port 80 and use HTTPS on
port 443. By reviewing the code we came to the conclusion
that there is a rare occurrence when the mirai malware would
connect the device to the IP address 5.206.225.96 on port 23
Telnet. This address hosts a game website, however blocking
this IP is a good form of protection and the device should not
be allowed to access it. Our suggested counter measure is to
block access to the aforementioned IP address.
In the release of the Mirai’s source code online by the
claimed author Anna-senpai [28], a text file was in the post
which clarified how some of the source codes processes
function. It explained how the port 48101 was used to prevent
multiple instances of the bots running together and therefore
was partially needed for the malware to operate correctly.
Blocking this port can help secure the possibility of the
malware infecting the device. If the IoT device runs BusyBox,
the commands issued by the malware are executed in the
BusyBox environment. A method of securing and preventing
this is to secure the BusyBox execution to be run by a user that
is specified by the device owner. Therefore, the malware will
not have permission to execute its commands and continue its
spreading of the infection.
IP cameras are beginning to integrate smart phone appli-
cations into their devices where the users can view the live
camera feed directly from the app. Another feature of this
app is to send email alerts via SMTP to the user’s email
address to alert them of something such as a trigger of the
motion detectors. As counter measure we propose to disable
the SMTP protocol which is normally run through port 25 but
this might need to be checked as it can be run on other ports.
FTP servers are normally enabled by default on IoT devices
and can be used to transfer files to and from the device. This
can result in dangerous files being moved onto the device and
should be disabled to prevent this. TFTP can be used by the
malware if the device does not support the wget tool and this
should also be disabled.
To automate the process of hardening the devices, a script
was developed to be run on the device which made the
necessary essential changes that the devices allowed. Limi-
tations were presented in the design of the script as devices
running Linux with BusyBox had limited functionality and
did not allow all the proposed defensive measures to be
implemented. We also devleopped a piece of code written in
the programming language C which is the same language the
Mirai’s malware uses. It is designed to locate the processes in
the /proc folder running on the device which are using the three
folders /root/, /tmp/ and /var/tmp/. The scrpit will attempt to
narrow and refine the search until only the processes the Mirai
malware is using are left and it will use the kill function to
end the process. This in turn will stop the infection and any
communication with the CNC server. We also used another
script developped by Frank et al. [29], which introduced
another approach to prevent infection of the device via the
malware. Its function was to create a temporary BusyBox
wrapper, which when the known methods of the Mirai’s
malware were used, it would execute them onto the BusyBox
wrapper and not directly onto the device.
Soon after we were done with the implementation of the
proposed defensive measures, we attempted to infect the
devices once more using our initial methodology. As expected,
this time attempts did not have any success.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As the complexity and functionality of IoT devices increase,
it won’t just be consumers that adopt them. Cities and com-
panies will also proceed to adopt the technology to make
everything smart and connected while saving money and time.
This worldwide adoption, however, provides a fertile feeding
ground for attackers to prey on and with more and more
devices connected worldwide, it will only continue to facilitate
their hunger to design attacks. A lot of malware targeting IoT
devices have been built and among them, Mirai is very popular
due to infecting millions of devices.
The scope of our work was to test how secure and especially
how resistant everyday IoT devices can be against the Mirai
malware. We built our testbed environment using three low
cost IoT devices and one virtualised, simulated, device. Our
experiments concluded that three out of the four devices
were vulnerable to the Mirai malware and became infected.
This proved that the factory security configurations are not
sufficient and at an acceptable level for consumers and leaves
their devices exposed by default.
After evaluating the success rate of our attacks, we came
up with a range of defensive measures that would harden
the IoT devices against the Mirai malware. Meeting our
expectations, the security configurations proved to work, as
none of the devices could be infected again using our initial
attack methodology. We hope that the proposed solutions can
be used by companies in the original design of devices and
their firmware to ensure the security implemented is at an
acceptable level for consumers.
If the Mirai botnet was able to bring down a number of
popular websites, the potential for even more dangerous forms
of attacks will become a serious security concern. As the size
of botnets grows and the attacks become more sophisticated,
the IoT devices could be weaponised and used to take down
entire power grids. Acknowledging the fact that the line of
defence needs to begin at the end point, i.e. the physical
devices, we plan to test a wider range of devices as our future
work. Additionally, our end goal is to create an automated
software tool that will evaluate their vulnerabilities of the
aforementioned devices against known attack vectors, thus
supporting both the producers and the consumers.
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